Monday, August 18, 2008

Protecting Marriage in California

Thank you everyone for your comments. My cousin Lori also commented on some of the points that others were wondering about, and she asked if I make a post of it here.

By Lori

Thank you for articulating your thoughts on this matter so well. As you know, in May the California Supreme Court overturned a voter initiative from 2000 which defines marriage between a man and a woman by a vote of 4-3. I recently read part of the Supreme Court’s legal opinion. I really enjoyed an argument made by one of the dissenting justices showing how the majority opinion inappropriately compares this to a civil rights issue and wanted to share it. The justice discusses how granting the right to an education or the right to vote to all races and genders did not change the nature of what means to get an education or vote. Conversely, when two people of the same gender are allowed to marry, it does change the very definition of marriage as understood since the beginning of Statehood.

The following is an excerpt from Justice’s Corrigan, J concurring and dissenting opinion from pg. 157 of the May California supreme court decision.

“What is unique about this case is that plaintiffs seek both to join the

institution of marriage and at the same time to alter its definition. The majority

maintains that plaintiffs are not attempting to change the existing institution of

marriage. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 53.) This claim is irreconcilable with the

majority’s declaration that “[f]rom the beginning of California statehood, the legal

institution of civil marriage has been understood to refer to a relationship between

a man and a woman.” (Id. at p. 23, fn. omitted.) The people are entitled to

preserve this traditional understanding in the terminology of the law, recognizing

that same-sex and opposite-sex unions are different. What they are not entitled to

do is treat them differently under the law.


The distinction between substance and nomenclature makes this case

different from other civil rights cases. The definition of the rights to education, to

vote, to pursue an office or occupation, and the other celebrated civil rights

vindicated by the courts, were not altered by extending them to all races and both

genders. The institution of marriage was not fundamentally changed by removing

the racial restrictions that formerly encumbered it. Plaintiffs, however, seek to

change the definition of the marital relationship, as it has consistently been

understood, into something quite new. They could certainly accomplish such a

redefinition through the initiative process. As a voter, I might agree. But that

change is for the people to adopt, not for judges to dictate.”

I am not opposed to gay relationships existing, nor having gay couples with similar rights (such as visitation rights) as married couples. In fact, according to the California Supreme court domestic partnerships in California already have “all the substantive benefits” that married couples have. Because homosexual relationships are fundamentally different from heterosexual relationships and because homosexual relationships already have “all the same substantive benefits” as married couples, voters have the right to call these unions by different names- as they are fundamentally different, and in order to preserve the traditional definition and institution of marriage.